You can’t because after 11 years of failing UN resolutions, a constant cat and mouse game, Saddam kicking out the UN inspectators, and the UN not enforcing THEIR OWN RESOLUTIONS (*ahem* UN resolution 1441 ring a bell?), and Saddam actively seeking nuclear capabilities? I don’t know what else is left to do? Continue the dance, or go in and stomp on his balls? I opted for the second. What would you prefer? What about criticizing the UN? What other solutions were there?
Yeah that’s ONE way of looking at it (i.e selectively).
How about waiting for the inspectors to complete their job when they finally had the chance - why wait 12 years and then when full co-operation is given (to the point where Blix said it would only take a few more months) give up and invade a country resulting in the forseeable deaths of tens of thousands of people ?
Aside from the fact that you can’t hold up UN resolutions are being important on one hand, and take action without UN support because things don’t go your own way on the other because you’ve proved jack shit to those who matter.
First you had me laughing, then I realized you need a refresher course:
1992
U.S. launches cruise missile on Baghdad, after Iraq attempts to assassinate President George H. W. Bush while he visited Kuwait (June 27).
1997
The UN disarmament commission concludes that Iraq has continued to conceal information on biological and chemical weapons and missiles (Oct 23).
Iraq expelexpelsAmerican members of the UN inspection team (Nov. 13).
1998
Iraq suspends all cooperation with the UN inspectors (Jan. 13).
UN secretary-general Kofi Annan brokers a peaceful solution to the standoff. Over the next months Baghdad continued to impede the UN inspection team, demanding that sanctions be lifted (Feb. 23).
Saddam Hussein puts a complete halt to the inspections (Oct. 31).
Iraq agrees to unconditional cooperation with the UN inspectors (Nov. 14), but by a month later, chief UN weapons inspector Richard Butler reports that Iraq has not lived up to its promise (Dec. 15).
2002
The UN Security Council revamps the sanctions against Iraq, now eleven years old, replacing them with “smart sanctions” meant to allow more civilian goods to enter the country while at the same time more effectively restricting military and dual-use equipment (military and civilian).
President Bush addresses the UN, challenging the organization to swiftly enforce its own resolutions against Iraq. If not, Bush contends, the U.S. will have no choice but to act on its own against Iraq.
Congress authorizes an attack on Iraq.
The UN Security Council unanimously approves resolution 1441 imposing tough new arms inspections on Iraq and precise, unambiguous definitions of what constitutes a “material breach” of the resolution. Should Iraq violate the resolution, it faces “serious consequences,” which the Security Council would then determine.
UN weapons inspectors return to Iraq, for the first time in almost four years
2003
UN inspectors discover 11 undeclared empty chemical warheads in Iraq.
The UN’s formal report on Iraqi inspections is highly critical, though not damning, with chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix stating that “Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament that was demanded of it.”
Hans Blix orders Iraq to destroy its Al Samoud 2 missiles by March 1. The UN inspectors have determined that the missiles have an illegal range limit. Iraq can have missiles that reach neighboring countries, but not ones capable of reaching Israel.
The U.S., Britain, and Spain submit a proposed resolution to the UN Security Council that states that “Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it in Resolution 1441,” and that it is now time to authorize use of military force against the country
All diplomatic efforts cease when President Bush delivers an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to leave the country within 48 hours or else face an attack.
So CM, fill me in on all those entries where it says “Saddam gave us full co-operation, and gave our weapons inspectors full access to any and all of his facilities? What makes you think after 11 years of obstructing the role of the inspectators and expelling them and making billions of dollars off of the oil for food scandal that he would do anything BUT finally cooperate with inspections? Where in his history does it REMOTELY suggest he would finally give in and the give the inspectators access? We didn’t have to prove shit to anybody. Saddam’s actions spoke volumes about his intentions. I find it shocking you can’t see that simply by reading the above information.
Yeah Blix said it about 2 days before it was all on. He said they were getting pretty much full co-operation and that the whole process would be done within a few months. No refresher course needed. Thanks though. Nicely selective timeline that one.
Yeah Blix said it about 2 days before it was all on. He said they were getting pretty much full co-operation and that the whole process would be done within a few months. No refresher course needed. Thanks though. Nicely selective timeline that one.
Full cooperation? They were going to turn over the records of how they destroyed their WMD stockpiles and programs?
That was Blix’s original mission after all. Verify the evidence presented by Iraq that they complied. Not, absurdly, running all over the country looking for evidence the program was still on or not....
So, selective timelines? You have a rewritten narrative involving Blix expanding his mission, due to Iraqi noncompliance, and responsibilities into areas it was never intended to go.
Still better than a war, which should be a last resort.
Blix:
When our commission was established by a Security Council resolution in December 1999, the Council had recognized that there might still be weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq, despite the fact that a great deal of disarmament had been accomplished through UN inspections after the end of the Gulf War in 1991. In November 2002, a new round of inspections had been initiated to identify key remaining tasks in the disarming of Iraq.
Although the inspection organization was now operating at full strength and Iraq seemed as determined to give it prompt access everywhere, the United States appeared determined to replace our inspection force with an invasion army.
The tone in the Council was not combative or acrimonious. The struggle was over. The path of inspection had been blocked by the U.S., the UK and Spain, and a resolution implicitly blessing armed intervention had been blocked by the majority of states in the Security Council.
Perhaps it was convenient to blame the diplomatic failure on France, but it was evident that a majority of the members of the Council were against armed action at this juncture, though none of the states had excluded agreement on it at a subsequent stage. It is an interesting notion that when a small minority has been rebuffed by a strong majority, it is the majority that has failed the test.
Finally we turn to Dr Blix’s statement to the Security Council on 7 March 2003. Is there evidence here of Iraq’s failure to comply?
Referring to the voluntary destruction by Baghdad of al Samoud missiles (’an important operation’, as the earlier report had stated), Dr Blix famously said: ‘The destruction undertaken constitutes a substantial measure of disarmament - indeed, the first since the middle of the 1990s. We are not watching the breaking of toothpicks. Lethal weapons are being destroyed.’
Referring to other forms of Iraqi cooperation, Dr Blix said, ‘What are we to make of these activities? One can hardly avoid the impression that, after a period of somewhat reluctant cooperation, there has been an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the end of January.’
Dr Blix continued: ‘It is obvious that, while the numerous initiatives, which are now taken by the Iraqi side with a view to resolving some long-standing open disarmament issues, can be seen as *active*, or even *proactive*, these initiatives 3-4 months into the new resolution cannot be said to constitute *immediate* cooperation. Nor do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance. They are nevertheless welcome and UNMOVIC is responding to them in the hope of solving presently unresolved disarmament issues.’
In other words, far from ‘evidence of Iraq’s continuing further material breach, its failure to comply with its clear obligations’ ‘mounting’, as Jack Straw claims, the reverse was the case.
Iraq’s compliance with its obligations was increasing, not decreasing.
Iraq’s cooperation was increasing not decreasing.
KEY REMAINING DISARMAMENT TASKS
On the topic of Iraqi cooperation, Dr Blix made an important observation in his 7 March address:
‘While cooperation can and is to be immediate, disarmament and at any rate the verification of it cannot be instant. Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude, induced by continued outside pressure, it would still take some time to verify sites and items, analyse documents, interview relevant persons, and draw conclusions. It would not take years, nor weeks, but months.’
This was Dr Blix’s answer to his own question: ‘How much time would it take to resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks?’
What were these ‘key remaining disarmament tasks’? Dr Blix reminded the Security Council that his organisation UNMOVIC (the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) was set up by UN Security Council Resolution 1284 in December 1999.
He said: ‘Resolution 1284 (1999) instructs UNMOVIC to “address unresolved disarmament issues” and to identify “key remaining disarmament tasks” [in Iraq] and the latter are to be submitted for approval by the Council in the context of a work programme.’
The ‘key remaining disarmament tasks’ were those actions that Iraq would have to carry out (under UN supervision) in order to satisfy the outside world that Baghdad no longer possessed weapons of mass destruction. The ‘cluster document’ invoked by Jack Straw was actually drawn up in order to identify the priority areas which should go into the list of ‘key remaining disarmament tasks’ for Iraq.
Dr Blix told the Security Council that the list of tasks, and the inspectors’ work programme, would be finalized shortly and presented to the Security Council for approval. It was actually delivered on 17 March 2003, the day the inspectors were ordered out of Iraq by President Bush, and Dr Blix made an oral presentation regarding the key remaining disarmament tasks on 19 March, shortly before the bombs began to fall.
Cm, it only reads different since it was written for a book. Why would he completely reverse his initial thoughts when he was also quoted in 2003 as saying:
The UN’s formal report on Iraqi inspections is highly critical, though not damning, with chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix stating that “Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament that was demanded of it.”
Yet, Mr. Blix, an infinitely patient international civil servant, could never bring himself to do so - at least consciously. But yesterday, in an extraordinary report to the United Nations, he did so unconsciously. In the most careful, lawyerly fashion, Mr. Blix unwittingly demonstrated that his efforts are leading nowhere, and that his mission is essentially over.
He did not, of course, say that in so many words. At first, he congratulated the Iraqis for their cooperation on “process”: “It would appear from our experience so far that Iraq has decided in principle to provide cooperation on process, notably access. A similar decision is indispensable to provide cooperation on substance in order to bring the disarmament task to completion, through the peaceful process of inspection, and to bring the monitoring task on a firm course.”
All lawyers (Mr. Blix is a lawyer) know the difference between process and substance. By “process” he meant letting U.N. inspectors tour some 230 suspected weapon sites, almost all of which had been visited already by previous groups of inspectors. By “substance” he meant real disarmament, toward which he had to admit that the Iraqis still have done virtually nothing.
“One might have expected,” Mr. Blix wrote, that Iraq would have explained the following:
- Evidence that it had tried to put VX, the deadliest form of nerve gas, into weapon-usable form.
- One thousand tons of poison gas contained in 6,500 missing chemical bombs.
- Several thousand missing rocket warheads for carrying poison gas.
- Some 8,500 missing liters of anthrax and enough growth media to produce 5,000 liters more.
- The illegal import of 300 rocket engines and other components for ballistic missiles.
- Illegal tests of long-range missiles that Iraq is not supposed to possess.
- Three-thousand pages of undeclared documents on the enrichment of uranium at the home of an Iraqi nuclear-weapon scientist.
This is a terrifying list of destructive potential to leave in the hands of someone like Saddam Hussein. Failing to account for it is a lack of cooperation on “substance,” and surely a material breach of Iraq’s obligations. But Mr. Blix is unable to say so. The report deliberately avoids taking any position on this point. The implication, however, is clear: With no progress on substance - that is, disarmament - the cooperation on process is irrelevant.
Mr. Blix’s only prescription for solving this problem is to give the inspections more time. But that makes no sense in light of what he has reported. It is, the U.N. chief inspector says,the lack of a decision by the Iraqi government to disarm that is the stumbling block. “Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it.”
Making a decision doesn’t take long, especially in a dictatorship. Giving the inspectors more time has nothing to do with complying with U.N. Resolution 1441. The truth is that Mr. Blix’s mission so far has not produced any progress toward disarmament, and is not likely to do so in the future.
It gets even better:
What, then, can we expect to happen next? If the inspectors find more evidence that Saddam is lying - more evidence of hidden warheads or illegal imports, for example - it will only prove more clearly that disarmament isn’t taking place. Obviously, this has nothing to do with achieving the peaceful disarmament Mr. Blix hopes to achieve. On the other hand, if the inspectors fail to find more evidence, that will not prove that Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction as long as Saddam refused to account for the frightening list of missing items.
reads bit differently innit? On the one hand, he may have THOUGHT there was progress, but as noted above, this clearly was not happening. The UN report was highly critical, there was a long list of things Iraq still had no ansers for, and were not in the process of actively trying to explain them away. This was in violation of the 1441 resoltuon, and thus we were given no other alternative. The UN was not willing to enforce their own resolutions (three words to explain that: OIL FOR FOOD), and inspections had showed an unwillingness by Iraq to cooperate full and FULLY disarm.
What other alternatives were there? More inspections? To prove what? That Iraq still was not disarming? PRove that Iraq DID have WMD’s? Then WHAT? Give Saddam ANOTHER chance to come clean? Then what? Hope he doesn’t start another nuke program up like he did in the past?
After being fooled in the 1980s (when Saddam ran a secret A-bomb program under the noses of Mr. Blix’s inspectors at the International Atomic Energy Agency) and fooled again in the 1990s (when Saddam destroyed entire buildings to hide evidence of bomb making) and then brushed off last month when Saddam’s minions handed Mr. Blix a 12,000-page report in which none of his questions were answered - it would be normal to be upset and even, maybe, to reach for Saddam’s throat.
What is there left to do but to go in and forcefully remove him? I hear you trying to debunk what I’m saying, but I don’t hear any solutions or alternatives, much less any proof that Saddam was fully cooperating and disarming when we invaded. Except a book by Hans Blix that directly contradicts what he’s said and testified in front on the UN. REALLY convincing that is. . . .
No only that first part was from the book. The rest, the part which says “THE 7 MARCH BLIX STATEMENT” is from his statement of 7 March 2003.
What is there left to do ? Come on, you sound like the politicians who were acting more scared and more scared throughout the process, like something was actually happening to threaten the world. Nothing was happening.
Continue the inspections, as Blix said, they probably would have only needed a few more months.
You either buy into the UN system of determining when to invade countries, or you don’t. If you buy in, you don’t just do it when you feel like it.
You either buy into the weapons inspection process or not, If you buy in, you don’t decide to invade on a whim at the time of your own choosing when Iraq is giving more access than ever before.
I could spot the Blix-bashing coming a mile away though. So predictable. I’m sure Blix rolled his eyes when it started happening too, but wasn’t at all surprised.
Hans Blix, the chief United Nations weapons inspector, branded his detractors in Washington yesterday as “bastards”, claiming that they sought to undermine his three-year mission.
Mr Blix also rounded on the Pentagon, where he said “some elements” had orchestrated a smear campaign against him during his mission to root out Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.
“I have my detractors in Washington. There are bastards who spread things around, who planted nasty things in the media,” he told the Guardian. “Not that I cared much. It was like a mosquito bite in the evening that is there in the morning, an irritant.”
It’s one thing to be highly critical in a formal report to the UN. It’s entirely another for one or two nations to pick out the parts they want, ignore the process that is clearly set down, and decide to invade a country and foreseeably kill tens of thousands of people.
BTW isn’t this all consistent with the theory that the whole process (from 2002 onwards) was set up to fail ? (As was proposed by Jack Straw when the British were trying to figure out how to get the point of invasion)
I get the idea that Blix pretty much knew what he was being used for.
“The UN was not willing to enforce their own resolutions”
Well that’s entirely up to them to decide when and how to do that, not the US.
Kinda the whole point of the system.
As I said, you either buy into the systems in place or you don’t.
Mine was technically a question, not an answer. And I would like an answer.
ILoveAmerica - 18 August 2005 05:26 PM
I love to see you squirm!!!!
Who are you talking too?
Anybody who wishes to address the issue I brought up. I was attempting to incite serious and meaningful debate with anyone who wishes to join in. After all, this is a discussion forum.
One is unable to support the troops but not support the president huh?
Well let’s see, the Commander in Chief oversees the military and to a degree you could say he gives them their orders. If you do not support the President, then you don’t support the troops.
Sp if you know for a fact the public servant we elected (kind of) made a mistake and sent the troops into a mission that turned out to be a mistake....you keep the trops in there and support the resident regardless? I am sorry, I cannot do that. If the troops are i harm’s way because of bad judgement and a mistake, I will express my displeasure and my non-support of the president...and show my support for the troops by getting them home and out of that mess the afotrementioned idiot out them into.
I support the troops, and I do not support Bush And I have the “freedom” to do so, and a right to do so.
I don’t NEED to know when they are pulling out of there, and in the sense of national security, I feel the general public shouldn’t have to know either.
It needs to be balanced. Yes, there are national security concerns, but they must be balanced with a free and open democracy and a free press. I do not want some secret governmnet. Keep the nuclear launch codes secret of course, but the politicians need to tell us what is going on as best as possible Secrecy leads to too many abuses.
Again, your logic seems flawed here. The soldiers are coming home in body bags because they signed up to go fight for their country.
But the “fight for the country” reason of disarming Sadaam from his WMDs turned out to be a lie and/or a distortion!! So the reason is not valid anymore! Get them home now!
Why Iraqi oil is not financing this? I wish it would seeing as how I’m paying a bloody arm and a leg for gas right now! But then again, it was always about the oil - right? A classic case of the left using the facts so it suits your purpose. Also, read a newspaper, watch a newscast. The CNN’s, NBC’s of the world know EXACTLY how much we’ve spent so far, so what’s the point?
That when the Bush administration assured us that within 6 months that Iraq’s oil revenue would be paying for this.. it was another one of their LIES .
We cannot criticize Bush for not doing enough in the diplomatic area prior to the invasion huh?
Continue the dance, or go in and stomp on his balls? I opted for the second.
I opted for a third choice...stop dancing, try something else...other than dropping bompbs. Be creative! Where is that great American ingenuilty I hear so much of? We can do anything!!
Unfortunately, you must not know very much about military planning because it just doesn’t happen that way.
Of course I do, please stop patronizing me. The fact is there are many people coming forward that reveal Bush gave no thought whatsoever to any kind of an aftermath plan or plans. I know you cannot know what will happen, but you can have some contigency plans. Like, training the soldiers how to remove all the flowers out of the gun barrels that will be showered upon the “liberators”, how to gear up for civil unrest and no police on the streets in the aftermath. If the Bush “think"-tank (if you can call it that) spent less time and how to control the American press using their propaganda and more time on dealing with the aftermath’s possibilies..then we might have less dead soldiers. And that my friend would be honoring the sodliers.
Honoring the soldiers is not just having a parade and bulding monuments. Is is also not sending them into harm’s way unless absolutely and totally necessary; giving them the body armor and equipement they need; and planning smartly to reduce casualties and chaos that the soldiers have to deal with.
irst you had me laughing, then I realized you need a refresher course:
I think you need to leave Bush’s lalaland and come back to reality:
[Gen. Anthony Zinni] was there in Nashville in August 2002 to receive the group’s Dwight D. Eisenhower Distinguished Service Award, recognition for his 35 years in the Marine Corps.
Vice President Cheney was also there, delivering a speech on foreign policy. Sitting on the stage behind the vice president, Zinni grew increasingly puzzled. He was alarmed that day to hear Cheney make the argument for attacking Iraq on grounds that Zinni found questionable at best:
“Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction,” Cheney said. “There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us.”
Cheney’s certitude bewildered Zinni. As chief of the Central Command, Zinni had been immersed in U.S. intelligence about Iraq. He was all too familiar with the intelligence analysts’ doubts about Iraq’s programs to acquire weapons of mass destruction, or WMD. “In my time at Centcom, I watched the intelligence, and never—not once—did it say, ‘He has WMD.’ “
Though retired for nearly two years, Zinni says, he remained current on the intelligence through his consulting with the CIA and the military. “I did consulting work for the agency, right up to the beginning of the war. I never saw anything. I’d say to analysts, ‘Where’s the threat?’ “ Their response, he recalls, was, “Silence.”
Zinni writes: (in a new book about his career, co-written with Tom Clancy, called “Battle Ready") “In the lead up to the Iraq war and its later conduct, I saw at a minimum, true dereliction, negligence and irresponsibility, at worse, lying, incompetence and corruption.”
“Not just generals, but others—diplomats, those in the international community that understood the situation. Friends of ours in the region that were cautioning us to be careful out there. I think he should have known that.”
Instead, Zinni says the Pentagon relied on inflated intelligence information about weapons of mass destruction from Iraqi exiles, like Ahmed Chalabi and others, whose credibility was in doubt.
Zinni is talking about a group of policymakers within the administration known as “the neo-conservatives” who saw the invasion of Iraq as a way to stabilize American interests in the region and strengthen the position of Israel. They include Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz; Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith; Former Defense Policy Board member Richard Perle; National Security Council member Eliot Abrams; and Vice President Cheney’s chief of staff, Lewis “Scooter” Libby.
Zinni believes they are political ideologues who have hijacked American policy in Iraq.
“I think it’s the worst kept secret in Washington. That everybody - everybody I talk to in Washington has known and fully knows what their agenda was and what they were trying to do,” says Zinni.
“It is part of your duty. Look, there is one statement that bothers me more than anything else. And that’s the idea that when the troops are in combat, everybody has to shut up. Imagine if we put troops in combat with a faulty rifle, and that rifle was malfunctioning, and troops were dying as a result,” says Zinni.
“I can’t think anyone would allow that to happen, that would not speak up. Well, what’s the difference between a faulty plan and strategy that’s getting just as many troops killed? It’s leading down a path where we’re not succeeding and accomplishing the missions we’ve set out to do.”
We were all wrong,’’ David Kay, the Bush administration’s former top weapons sleuth in Iraq, recently told members of Congress after acknowledging that there were probably no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. I, for one, was not. I did my level best to demand facts from the Bush administration to back up their allegations regarding Iraq’s WMD and, failing that, spoke out and wrote in as many forums as possible in an effort to educate the publics of the United States and the world about the danger of going to war based on a hyped-up threat.
In this I was not alone. Rolf Ekeus, the former head of the UN weapons inspec tors in Iraq, has declared that under his direction, Iraq was ‘‘fundamentally disarmed’’ as early as 1996. Hans Blix, who headed UN weapons inspections in Iraq in the months before the invasion in March 2003, stated that his inspectors had found no evidence of either WMD or WMD-related programs in Iraq. And officials familiar with Iraq, like Ambassador Joseph Wilson and State Department intelligence analyst Greg Theilmann, both exposed the unsustained nature of the Bush administration’s claims regarding Iraq’s nuclear capability.
The riddle surrounding Iraq’s WMD was solvable without resorting to war. For all the layers of deceit and obfuscation, there existed enough basic elements of truth and substantive fact about the disposition of Saddam Hus sein’s secret weapons programs to permit the Gordian knot to be cleaved by anyone willing to try. Sadly, it seems that there was no predisposition on the part of those assigned the task of solving the riddle to do so.
Bush’s decision to limit the scope of any inquiry to intelligence matters, effectively blocking any critique of his administration’s use — or abuse — of such intelligence, is absurd, especially when one considers that the Bush administration was already talking of war with Iraq in 2002, prior to the preparation of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) — the defining document on a particular area of the world or specified threat — by the director of Central Intelligence.
According to a Department of Defense after-action report on Iraq titled ‘‘Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategic Lessons Learned,’’ a copy of which was obtained by The Washington Times in September 2003, ‘‘President Bush approved the overall war strategy for Iraq in August last year.’’ The specific date cited was Aug. 29, 2002 — eight months before the first bomb was dropped.
The CIA did eventually produce a National Intelligence Estimate for Iraq, but only in October 2002, after Bush had already decided on war. The title of the NIE, ‘‘Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction,’’ is reflective of a predisposition that was not supported either by the facts available at the time, or by the passage of time.
On and on and on and on........
Excerpts from my repository of proof that Bush LIED about Iraq in the old forum:
Mine was technically a question, not an answer. And I would like an answer.
ILoveAmerica - 18 August 2005 05:26 PM
I love to see you squirm!!!!
Who are you talking too?
Anybody who wishes to address the issue I brought up. I was attempting to incite serious and meaningful debate with anyone who wishes to join in. After all, this is a discussion forum.
Wrong again. I want to know who on this board you were refering to when you said:
ILoveAmerica - 18 August 2005 05:26 PM
I love to see you squirm!!!!
Wrong again. I want to know who on this board you were refering to when you said:
I love to see you squirm!!!!
The usual suspects.
First off, I editted it out because I admitted it was “over the edge”. Secondly, it was a call out to the Bush kool-aid drinking crowd that hangs around here. Why is that so hard to understand? As it says in the “Forum Rules”, this is a rightwing website and forum, and the majority of the posters are rightwing. Why is this so hard to understand? What point are you trying to make and why are you making a big deal out of such a small thing? You got this “gotcha"psychotic thing going like you caught me with my hand in the cookie jar or something. Calm down there Inspector Clouseau.
